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Abstract—Hardware-supported security mechanisms like Intel
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide strong security guar-
antees, which are particularly relevant in cloud settings. However,
their reliance on physical hardware conflicts with cloud practices,
like migration of VMs between physical platforms. For instance,
the SGX trusted execution environment (enclave) is bound to a
single physical CPU.
Although prior work has proposed an effective mechanism to
migrate an enclave’s data memory, it overlooks the migration of
persistent state, including sealed data and monotonic counters;
the former risks data loss whilst the latter undermines the
SGX security guarantees. We show how this can be exploited to
mount attacks, and then propose an improved enclave migration
approach guaranteeing the consistency of persistent state. Our
software-only approach enables migratable sealed data and mono-
tonic counters, maintains all SGX security guarantees, minimizes
developer effort, and incurs negligible performance overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has brought numerous benefits in terms of
scalability, elasticity, and efficiency. However, this outsourcing
of computation to potentially untrusted machines has also
given rise to various security concerns. It is widely acknowl-
edged that hardware-supported security mechanisms can be
used to address these concerns. For example, Intel’s Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) technology enables an application
to create trusted execution environments, called enclaves, in
which security-sensitive data can be stored and processed. The
code and data inside an enclave is protected from all other
software on the platform, including the OS and hypervisor.
Using remote attestation, an enclave can provide strong as-
surance to a remote party about the precise software being
run inside the enclave. However, the strong hardware-enforced
security guarantees provided by SGX inherently conflict with
cloud practices. For instance, how can a virtual machine (VM)
containing one or more SGX enclaves be securely migrated
between physical machines?
Previous work by Park et al. [1] and Gu et al. [2] has
considered the challenge of migrating SGX enclaves between
physical machines. Park et al. [1] first identified the central
challenge of migrating the data held securely within an en-
clave, and suggested that this could be solved with a new
hardware instruction. The state-of-the-art solution by Gu et
al. [2] solves this challenge using a software-only approach.
By adding a library inside the enclave, they are able to pause
the operation of an enclave and write out the enclave’s memory
pages, encrypted for the same enclave on the destination
machine. In the destination enclave, the equivalent library
reads in and maps these encrypted memory pages, and allows
the enclave to resume execution.
However, neither of these previous approaches have con-
sidered enclaves that require persistent state, which is stored
outside the enclave itself. Specifically, they do not support
migration of enclaves that use sealed data and/or monotonic
counters. Sealing is a feature that allows an enclave to encrypt
data with a key known only to the enclave (the sealing
key), so that the encrypted data can be securely stored in
persistent storage outside the enclave. The sealed data can
later be returned to the enclave and decrypted. By default,
SGX sealing uses authenticated encryption (i.e., AES-GCM),
which allows the enclave to detect if the sealed data has been
modified externally. However, in the SGX threat model, the
OS and hypervisor are not trusted, and so the enclave has
no guarantee that it has received the latest version of the
sealed data. To overcome this challenge, SGX provides each
enclave with up to 256 hardware-backed monotonic counters.
An enclave can read and increment these counters, and SGX
guarantees that the counter cannot be decremented. When the
enclave seals data, it increments a counter and includes the
new counter value in the sealed data. Thus when the data is
unsealed, the enclave can detect if it is not the most recent
version by comparing the included value against the hardware
counter’s current value. Additionally, monotonic counters can
be used for various other application-specific purposes within
the enclave (e.g., keeping track of transactions performed by
the enclave).
We refer to sealed data and monotonic counters collectively
as the persistent state of an enclave. As we show in Section III,
failure to migrate this persistent state could lead to data loss
or attacks against otherwise secure systems, such as the recent
Teechan payment system [3] or the Hybster state-machine
replication protocol [4].
According the SGX Developer Guide [5], an enclave is
destroyed, and its data memory irrecoverably lost whenever:
• The application closes the enclave; or
• The application itself is closed or crashes; or
• The machine is hibernated or shutdown.
Enclaves should therefore always have the ability to store their
important data as persistent state at short notice, whenever
any of the above events take place. It is reasonable to assume
that most real-world enclaves have data that must be persisted
(e.g., cryptographic keys or other secrets provisioned to the
enclave through remote attestation). Even if an enclave stores
some of its data on a shared storage, or other remote device,
so that it can be accessed by the enclave from different
physical machines, it still requires local persistent storage for
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key and counters needed for using that shared storage. Thus
when considering enclave migration, it is critical to consider
migration of persistent state.
In this paper, we define a set of requirements to address this
challenge (Section IV) and propose an improved mechanism
for migrating enclaves with persistent state (Section V). We
achieve this by introducing a separate Migration Enclave
on both the source and destination machines. Our approach
focuses only on the migration of persistent state because,
as explained above, a well-designed enclave should always
have the ability to store its important data as persistent state.
Enclave can thus use this same mechanism to persist any
important information before they are migrated. If there are
cases where this is not feasible, we assume the enclave
developers will use an additional mechanism, such as that
proposed by Gu et al. [2]. Given the design of Intel SGX,
it is not possible to achieve transparent migration of enclaves
without requiring hardware modifications. However, as a first
step, we present a software-only approach can be used on
existing SGX hardware, and then discuss what would be
needed to enable transparent migration. We provide a proof-
of-concept implementation, available as open source software
(Section VI), and use this to evaluate the security, usability,
and performance of our solution (Section VII).
In summary, we claim the following contributions:
• We motivate the need to migrate persistent state by
showing how the omission of state migration could lead
to data loss and/or undermine the security guarantees of
SGX (Section III).
• We define an improved set of security requirements (Sec-
tion IV) and propose a new software-only architecture
and protocol for securely migrating SGX enclaves with
persistent state (Section V).
• We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by pro-
viding an open-source proof-of-concept implementation1
(Section VI), and we use this to evaluate the security,
performance, and usability of our approach (Section VII).
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Intel SGX
1) Isolated execution: Intel’s Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) technology is a set of CPU instructions that applications
can use to create enclaves – isolated execution environments
containing security-sensitive data and the software that oper-
ates on this data. Once an enclave has been initialized, SGX
ensures that the software running within the enclave cannot
be modified from outside the enclave. It also ensures that
execution of the enclave’s software can only begin from well-
defined entry points, known as ECALLs, to avoid software
attacks.
2) Memory protection: The SGX hardware ensures that
only code within the enclave can access the enclave’s memory,
thus protecting it against all other software on the platform,
including the OS and/or hypervisor. Specifically, the enclave’s
1All software is available at: https://github.com/SGX-Cloud
memory is mapped to a special area of physical memory
called the Enclave Page Cache (EPC). When enclave data
leaves the physical CPU boundary (e.g., is written to DRAM),
it is automatically encrypted to protect against attacks like
memory bus snooping. SGX provides integrity protection and
anti-replay protection for this memory, to prevent encrypted
memory pages being reverted to earlier versions.
3) Enclave and signing identities: When an enclave is
loaded, its software is measured to produce the enclave iden-
tity, also referred to as the MRENCLAVE value. Specifically,
for each memory page within the enclave, the contents and
the properties of the page are hashed to create a unique yet
deterministic representation of the enclave. This process will
result in the same value on any physical machine. Each enclave
can also be signed by the enclave developer, and the hash of
the developer’s public key constitutes the enclave’s signing
identity, also referred to as the MRSIGNER value.
4) Sealing: Sealing refers to the process of encrypting data
with a key known only to the enclave, so that the sealed data
can be stored outside the enclave. The SGX SDK provides a
default sealing function sgx_seal_data(), which obtains
an enclave- and machine-specific sealing key from the CPU
and encrypts data using an authenticated encryption algorithm
(i.e., AES-GCM). Data can be sealed against either the en-
clave’s identity (MRENCLAVE value) or the signing identity
(MRSIGNER value) [6]. Data sealed against MRENCLAVE
can only be decrypted by the same enclave, whereas data
sealed against MRSIGNER can be unsealed by any enclave
signed by the same developer (e.g., to allow upgrades of
enclave code). In both cases, the encryption key (sealing key)
is derived from a CPU-specific secret, so data can only be
unsealed on the same physical machine on which it was sealed.
SGX sealing thus guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
of sealed data, but does not automatically provide roll-back
protection. If required, the enclave developer must check that
the correct version of the sealed data has been provided.
Usually this can be achieved using secure monotonic counters.
5) Monotonic counters: With support from the Intel Plat-
form Software [7], each SGX enclave has access to up to
256 enclave-specific monotonic counters. These counters are
maintained by the platform’s hardware and firmware (e.g., the
Intel Management Engine). Counters are thus specific to a
physical machine, in the same way as sealing keys. When a
monotonic counter is created, Intel Platform Software assigns
it a counter UUID which consists of a counter ID and a nonce.
The counter ID uniquely identifies the counter while the nonce
ensures that it can only be accessed by the enclave that created
it. Because of this mechanism, it is not possible to destroy a
counter and create a new one with the same identifier but lower
value on the same physical machine.
6) Attestation: An SGX enclave can use attestation to
provide strong assurance of its identity to a relying party. We
refer to the attested enclave as the prover and the relying party
as the verifier in the attestation protocol. The verifier can use
the information included in the attestation to authenticate the
prover and establish a secure communication channel with the
prover. There are two types of attestation: local and remote.
Local attestation allows an SGX enclave to prove its identity
and authenticity to another enclave on the same physical ma-
chine. Specifically, the prover enclave uses an SGX hardware
instruction to generate a report for the verifier enclave. The
report includes the identity of the prover enclave, and may
also contain application-specific data. The CPU generates a
message authentication code (MAC) for the report, using a
symmetric key available only to the verifier enclave. Thus local
attestation inherently guarantees that the prover is a genuine
SGX enclave running on the same machine as the verifier. Two
local enclaves can establish a secure communication channel
by performing mutual local attestations and including key
agreement messages in the reports. Local attestation is also
used to enable communication between application enclaves
(i.e., enclaves from third-party developers) and architectural
enclaves provided by Intel. For example, the Platform Services
Enclave is an architectural enclave that allocates and manages
the monotonic counters for application enclaves.
Remote attestation allows an SGX enclave to prove its
identity to a verifier (not necessarily an enclave) on another
physical machine. It also assures the verifier that the prover is
a genuine SGX enclave. In order to achieve this, the prover
enclave first performs local attestation with its local Quoting
Enclave (QE), another architectural enclave provided by Intel.
The QE creates an SGX quote containing the identity of
the prover enclave (MRENCLAVE or MRSIGNER) and any
application-specific data provided by the prover enclave. The
QE signs the quote using the Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)
scheme [8], a group signature scheme that allows revocation
of compromised components. This signature on the quote can
be verified using the Intel Attestation Service (IAS).2
B. SGX Virtualization and Migration
Virtualization is a key enabler of cloud computing, allowing
multiple virtual machines (VMs) to be run on a single physical
machine. Typically, a hypervisor is used to manage and
schedule the different VMs on a machine. Virtualization aims
to provide better resource utilization, improved scalability, and
ease of maintenance. VMs are supposed to be self-contained,
disposable and easily migratable from one physical machine
to another. Currently, there is relatively little support for SGX
in virtualized environments. Experimental patches to Xen and
KVM managers are available [9], but their functionality is
limited to allocating EPC pages to a virtual machine.
Migration is a process of “moving” a virtual machine (VM)
from one physical machine (source) to another (destination).
In live migration, the migration is transparent to the VM [10].
The memory pages of the VM are copied from the source
machine to the destination machine, and then execution con-
tinues from the same place on the destination machine. If a
VM containing an SGX enclave were migrated using existing
VM migration techniques, the enclave would not be migrated
2https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/03/09/
intel-sgx-epid-provisioning-and-attestation-services
because the migration process would not be able to access the
EPC. In order to migrate the enclave, an SGX-aware migration
mechanism, such as that proposed by Park et al. [1] or Gu et
al. [2] must be used.
However, neither of these SGX-aware migration mech-
anisms are able to securely migrate enclaves that include
persistent state. If an enclave sealed any data on one physical
machine it will not be able to access it after migration, because
the sealing key on the destination machine will differ. Even
though the enclave’s identity remains unchanged, the sealing
key is derived from the CPU secret, which is unique to each
physical machine. Similarly, any monotonic counters created
by the enclave on the source machine will be lost when the
enclave migrates, because these are machine-specific.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ATTACKS
In this section we define the threat model for an enclave
migration mechanism, and describe potential attacks that could
arise if an enclave’s persistent state is not migrated.
A. Threat model
We assume the same threat model as SGX [11], in which the
trusted computing base (TCB) for a specific enclave consists
only of the SGX hardware and the code within that enclave.
From the enclave’s perspective, all other software on the
machine, including the OS and hypervisor, is untrusted.
We thus assume that the adversary has physical access to
the machine, privileged access to all software (including OS,
and hypervisor), and the ability to monitor and manipulate
all network traffic. As usual, we assume that the adversary
is unable to subvert correctly implemented cryptographic
primitives and, in general, is unable to subvert the security
guarantees of SGX on any single machine. However, recent
research on side-channel attacks against SGX [12], [13], [14]
has shown that in some cases, the latter assumption may not
hold. We evaluate the security of our scheme with respect to
side-channel attacks in Section VII.
The adversary’s goal is to use the migration mechanism to
subvert the SGX security guarantees, which would otherwise
not be possible. In particular, the adversary aims to mount
either a fork attack or a roll-back attack, as described below.
We assume that the adversary’s goals do not include denial-
of-service attacks, since our strong adversary already has full
control over the availability of the physical machine and all
enclaves. Thus, his motives are not to deny the service but to
undermine its security.
B. Fork Attack
The objective of a fork attack is to create two or more
copies of the same enclave with inconsistent state, potentially
running on different machines, in order to undermine some
application-specific security guarantee. In this section we con-
sider two recent SGX-based systems that are currently secure
but would become insecure if they were made migratable using
a mechanism that did not migrate persistent state.
Teechan [3] is a framework for establishing full-duplex
payment channels between SGX enclaves, in order to sup-
port frequently-repeated (micro) payments using blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies. Once two enclaves have established
a channel, they can exchange funds in either direction with
a single message. The authors explain that the enclaves can
“persist their state to secondary storage, encrypted under a
key and stored with a non-replayable version number from the
hardware monotonic counter” [3].
The Hybster state-machine replication protocol [4] intro-
duces a trusted subsystem, called TrInX, that provides a trusted
counter service using SGX. TrInX counters are distinct from
SGX hardware monotonic counters. The authors correctly
assume that “the execution platform provides a means to
prevent undetected replay attacks where an adversary saves
the (encrypted) state of a trusted subsystem and starts a new
instance using the exact same state to reset the subsystem” [4].
Although not stated, it can be assumed that this guarantee
would be provided using sealing and hardware monotonic
counters, as in Teechan.
We assume that in both Teechan and TrInX, any important
state information would be persisted before the enclave is
terminated.3 This would be done by incrementing a hardware
counter and sealing the new counter value along with the
enclave’s state as a version number. When the enclave is
restarted, it would only accept sealed data for which the
version number matches the current hardware counter value.
Now suppose either of these enclaves were made migratable
using a mechanism that does not migrate hardware counters.
A fork attack could proceed as follows:
1) Start-stop-restart: Start the enclave on the source ma-
chine and then signal that the application process will
be terminated. This causes the enclave to request a
monotonic counter c (since this is the first use), increment
the counter value (c = 1), and store its keys and important
information as persistent state with the current counter
value as a version number (v = 1). Restart the application
on the source machine using the persistent state.
2) Migrate: Migrate the VM containing this application
to the destination machine and continue operation (e.g.,
make transactions with Teechan and update TrInX coun-
ters). The application may persist its state arbitrarily many
times (v = 2, 3, 4, ...) using the monotonic counter on the
destination machine (c′).
3) Terminate-restart: Terminate the application process on
the source machine, then restart this process (still on
the source machine) using the persistent state created in
step 1 (c = v = 1).
This would allow two copies of the enclave to execute con-
currently on different machines with inconsistent state, thus
undermining the guarantees required by Teechan and Hybster.
The mechanism by Gu et al. [2] only partially mitigates such
3In practice, these enclaves might persist their state more frequently (e.g.,
to mitigate against unexpected crashes), but at a minimum they must do this
at least once before enclave termination.
fork attacks. In their protocol, once an enclave has been
migrated, the enclave on the source machine is prevented from
resuming operation by setting a flag that holds all the enclave’s
worker threads in a perpetual spin lock. However, the authors
do not state whether this flag is stored in persistent storage. If
the flag is not persisted, the above attack will succeed because
the flag will be cleared when the source enclave is terminated
and resumed (step 3). Alternatively, if the flag is persisted,
the fork attack will be prevented, but this would prevent the
same enclave from ever being migrated back to the source
machine, since this is indistinguishable from a fork attack.
The latter would place significant constraints on how the cloud
operator can manage the migration of VMs, thus reducing the
benefits of cloud computing. Therefore, migration of hardware
counters calls for careful design.
C. Roll-back Attack
In addition to fork attacks, the adversary may also be able
to mount roll-back attacks under certain circumstances. As
explained above, SGX-based systems like Teechan and TrInX
can protect the confidentiality and integrity of their persistent
state by encrypting it using a key available only to the enclave.
On a single machine, this could be achieved using the SGX
sealing functionality, but since the sealing key is machine-
specific (as explained in Section II), sealed data cannot be
directly migrated with a VM. The mechanism by Gu et al. [2]
does not support migration of sealed data. This could result
in data loss for enclaves that use sealed data. In order to
overcome this, an improved migration mechanism could allow
enclaves to seal data under a migratable key, such that it could
still be unsealed after migration.
As an alternative to SGX sealing, an enclave in a cloud
environment could request an encryption key from a Key
Distribution Center (KDC), such as the AWS Key Manage-
ment Service4 and use this to encrypt its persistent state.
The encrypted state could be stored in a specialized (high-
availability) storage service outside the VM, e.g., Amazon S3.5
In either case, the enclave would be able to access its per-
sistent (sealed) state after migration. However, if the migration
mechanism does not also migrate the enclave’s monotonic
counters, this could lead to a roll-back attack as follows:
1) Start-stop-restart: [As in step 1 of the fork attack]
2) Continue: Diverging from the fork attack, continue oper-
ation on the source machine (e.g., make transactions with
Teechan and update TrInX counters). The application may
persist its state arbitrarily many times (v = 2, 3, 4, ...)
using the monotonic counter on the source machine (c).
3) Migrate: Migrate the VM containing the application to
the destination machine and continue operation.
4) Terminate: Signal that the application process will be
terminated, causing the enclave to persist its state. Since
no counters have yet been created on the destination
machine, the enclave requests and increments a new
counter (c′ = 1).
4https://aws.amazon.com/kms/
5https://aws.amazon.com/s3/
5) Restart: Restart the application on the destination ma-
chine, but provide the original data package from the
source machine created in step 1 (v = 1). This is
accepted by the enclave because the counter value on
the destination machine matches the version number in
the sealed data (c′ = v = 1).
Thus by abusing the migration process, the adversary can roll-
back the state of the enclave’s monotonic counters, which
would otherwise not be possible. If it can be performed
repeatedly, this roll-back attack could achieve the same result
as the fork attack described above. Both of these attacks
undermine the current SGX security guarantees, and could
thus have serious consequences for enclaves that use persistent
state.
IV. REQUIREMENTS AND GOALS
A. Security Requirements
In order to prevent the attacks described above, the migra-
tion mechanism must meet the following requirements:
R1 SGX guarantees: The migration mechanism must main-
tain all SGX security guarantees that would be available
to an equivalent non-migratable enclave.
R2 Controlled migration: Migration must only be possible
if authorized by the machine owner, and the enclave must
migrate to the correct destination machine.
R3 Fork prevention: Any fork of persistent state in a migrat-
able enclave must also be possible against the equivalent
non-migratable enclave.
R4 Roll-back prevention: Any roll-back attack against per-
sistent state of a migratable enclave must also be possible
against the equivalent non-migratable enclave.
Requirement R1 ensures that the existing SGX security guar-
antees still apply to migratable enclaves (e.g., isolated ex-
ecution etc.). Requirements R2 to R4 are specific to en-
clave migration, which is not available by default in SGX.
Requirement R2 is important to ensure that the adversary
cannot use the migration mechanism to take control of an
enclave by migrating it to a machine under his control. For
example, this ensures that an enclave can only migrate to
another physical machine within the same cloud data center.
Requirements R3 and R4 directly address the fork and roll-
back attacks described in the previous section. Although it
is not possible to categorically prevent these attacks for all
enclaves (e.g., poorly-designed enclaves that may already be
vulnerable without migration), any migration mechanism must
not introduce new possibilities for such attacks. As explained
in Section III, denial-of-service attacks are not one of the
adversary’s objectives, and are thus not in scope.
B. Performance Goals
Enclave performance: A migratable enclave should not incur
a high performance overhead compared to an equivalent non-
migratable enclave. This means that any changes made to the
enclave or other software on the machine in order to enable
migration should not noticeably degrade the performance of
migratable enclaves.
Migration performance: Ideally, migrating a VM with en-
claves should not take significantly longer than migrating an
equivalent VM without enclaves. Even within data centers,
the process of copying the VM’s entire memory between two
machines can take in the order of seconds [10]. Any additional
time required to migrate the enclave should ideally be at least
an order of magnitude lower.
C. Usability Goals
Developer effort: Ideally, the effort required from developers
in order to make an enclave migratable should be minimal. It
is reasonable to require some input from the enclave developer
because the developer must also ensure that the functionality of
the enclave is compatible with migration (i.e., that the enclave
should be allowed to migrate).
V. DESIGN
Based on the requirements, we design and implement a
migration framework for SGX enclaves with persistent data.
It consists of two main components: a Migration Enclave
running on each physical machine, and a Migration Library
included in each migratable enclave. We first present an
overview of the whole design and then explain the roles of
the Migration Enclave and Migration Library in greater detail.
A. Design Overview
The overall design is shown in Figure 1. Each physical
machine has a single Migration Enclave, which runs in a
separate non-migratable VM. This is compatible with a typical
cloud environment in which each physical machine would have
a non-migratable management VM. The Migration Enclave is
responsible for managing the migration process of enclaves.
The enclave developer includes and uses the Migration Library
in each migratable enclave. This library provides migratable
versions of the sealing and monotonic counter functions from
the SGX API. It also performs local attestation of the Migra-
tion Enclave and communicates with it during the migration
process. The migration process consists of the following steps:
1) The application notifies the enclave that it will migrate
to a new machine.
2) The Migration Library locally attests the Migration En-
clave and sends the data required for the migration. At
the same time the Migration Library prevents further
operations of the enclave.
3) After the Migration Enclave receives all the data from
the library, it performs a mutual remote attestation with
the Migration Enclave on the destination machine. After
attesting and establishing a secure channel, the Migration
Enclaves authenticate each other to verify that both
machines are authorized machines of the same cloud
provider.
4) On the destination machine, the Migration Enclave
checks that the local destination enclave matches the
source enclave and, if so, sends the migration data to
the destination enclave’s Migration Library to complete
the migration.
Destination Enclave (ENC_dst)
- initialize:
  - Migrated enclave
  - Restored enclave (system restart)
- migratable seal/unseal
- migratable counter:
     create, read, increment, destroy
Destination Machine
Migration Enclave (ME_dst)
- Receives migration data
- Stores or directly forwards it to target
Source Enclave (ENC_src)
- initialize:
  - New enclave
  - Restored enclave (system restart)
- migratable seal/unseal
- migratable counter:
     create, read, increment, destroy
Migration Enclave (ME_src)
- Passes migration data to target
Source Machine
4
3
2
1
Fig. 1. Overview of the migration process.
The fact that in our protocol the application has to initiate
the migration is neither unrealistic nor a security issue. As
described in Section III, denial-of-service attacks are not in
scope since SGX does not provide any availability guarantees
for an enclave. A malicious application, OS, or hypervisor can
always prevent enclave migration. Our protocol’s main goal is
to ensure that when a migration does happen, the SGX security
guarantees are not violated and the additional requirements
defined in Section IV are met.
B. Migration Enclave
The Migration Enclave is responsible for managing the
migration process. As described in Section V-A, its main
operations are locally attesting the application enclaves and re-
motely attesting and authenticating other Migration Enclaves.
To verify the identities of Migration Enclaves running on
remote machines, each Migration Enclave is set up by the
cloud provider during a secure setup phase. This setup phase
can happen, for example, during the setup of the Management
VM that contains the Migration Enclave. In practice, the setup
phase could provide the Migration Enclaves with a key or a
certificate from an operator of the data center or by a server
owner. The goal of this setup phase is to ensure that enclaves
are only migrated inside the data center or to other trusted
servers (Requirement R2). The authentication performed by
the Migration Enclaves can also be used to limit the migration
of enclaves to a certain subset of servers, for example to
achieve regulatory compliance.
After the setup phase, the Migration Enclave can be used
by any application enclave on the machine by performing a
local attestation. After the attestation, the Migration Enclave
has the guarantee that its communication peer resides on the
same physical machine and is safe to migrate. There are
no further checks required from the application enclave as
the Migration Enclave guarantees that the application enclave
will be migrated to an identical enclave on the destination
machine. After performing the local attestation and receiving
the migration data, the Migration Enclave executes a mutual
remote attestation with the corresponding Migration Enclave
on the destination machine. If required, the Migration Enclaves
then exchange signatures on the transcript of the attestation
protocol, using the keys provisioned by the data center oper-
ator, to ensure that they are running in the same data center.
Finally, the migration data is sent via the secure channel.
For incoming migrations, the Migration Enclave performs a
remote attestation, verifies the identity of the remote Migration
Enclave, and receives the migration data. It then either notifies
the local application enclave of incoming data if it is already
running, or stores the data temporarily until the local enclave
has been started and locally attests to the Migration Enclave
to securely transfer the incoming migration data.
C. Migration Library
As discussed in Section II and Section III, it is not sufficient
to simply move an SGX enclave from one physical machine
to another. The purpose of the Migration Library is to provide
analogues of specific SGX primitives in order to enable
migration whilst providing the same security guarantees. Note
that the Migration Library and the application enclave that
utilizes the library reside in the same protection domain. This
means that they both trust each other fully as the Migration
Library can only protect an enclave that is cooperating and
the developer of the application enclave is assumed to have
reviewed the Migration Library code before utilizing it in his
enclave code.
We identify two main primitives that should be substituted
by migratable counterparts: sealing and monotonic counters.
The sealing key derived from the CPU secret is not suited for
encrypting migratable secrets because it is machine-specific.
Thus, our library provides its own implementation of the SGX
sealing and unsealing functions by generating a Migration
Sealing Key (MSK) and using the MSK for all sealing
operations. The MSK itself is sealed with the enclave’s own
sealing key and stored locally. It is reloaded and unsealed by
the Migration Library each time the enclave is restarted.
Monotonic counters are provided by the Intel Platform
Services Software, which includes a system enclave that
performs specific tasks such as creating, reading, incrementing,
and deleting monotonic counters of an application enclave.
The Platform Service guarantees that over the lifetime of
a counter, it can never be decreased and allows application
enclaves to use the monotonic counters for various tasks, such
as rollback protection. When migrating a monotonic counter,
the migration protocol needs to ensure two invariants:
• The monotonic counter must be rendered unusable on the
source machine in order to prevent fork attacks, as de-
scribed in Section III-B, and thus fulfil Requirement R3.
• The monotonic counter must be re-created with the same
value on the destination machine in order to prevent roll-
back attacks, as described in Section III-C, and thus fulfil
Requirement R4
The Migration Library ensures both of these when migrating
a monotonic counter by sending the counter values in the
migration data and increasing the counter to its original value
before the enclave can continue the execution. Before the
migration data is sent to the Migration Enclave, the Migration
Library also commands the Platform Service to delete all
counters managed by the library on the source machine. This
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Fig. 2. Migration protocol diagram
prevents fork attacks that aim to restart the Migration Library
before the migration has completed but after the counters have
been set up on the destination machine.
In addition to providing migratable versions of sealing and
monotonic counters, the Migration Library also performs the
local attestation of the Migration Enclave and communicates
with it to start a migration or to receive a migration on startup
via a secured channel.
D. The Migration Process
Figure 2 shows the migration process as an interaction
between the Migration Libraries and the Migration Enclaves.
The untrusted parts of the applications are not shown in this
figure, but all interaction between the enclaves takes place via
untrusted channels. Therefore, the enclaves establish their own
secure channels between one another using attestation.
After initializing the Migration Library, a migration can be
requested by the application (e.g., once the application has
been notified that it will be migrated). The Migration Library
on the source machine contacts its local Migration Enclave,
sets up an encrypted channel based on local attestation, and
sends the data to migrate. This data includes the MSK, the cur-
rent counter values, and the address of the destination machine.
After receiving the migration data, the Migration Enclave on
the source machine contacts the remote Migration Enclave on
the destination machine and sets up an encrypted channel using
remote attestation. This remote attestation includes verifying
the integrity of the Migration Enclaves and checking whether
they belong to the same cloud provider. Next, the data is sent
to the Migration Enclave on the destination machine, where
it is forwarded to a local Migration Library in the destination
enclave. Either the local Migration Library has already been
started and is awaiting an incoming migration, or the Migration
Enclave stores the data temporarily until the Migration Library
contacts the Migration Enclave. After sending the migration
data to the correct Migration Library, the data is processed
and the Migration Library sends back a confirmation of a
successful migration. This confirmation is sent back to the
source machine, which can then safely delete the migration
data. If there is an error during the migration process, the
migration data remains in the Migration Enclave on the source
machine until the error is resolved or another destination
machine is selected to complete the migration process.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented the Migration Library and the Mi-
gration Enclave and made these available as open source
software.6 Data center operators can also create and deploy
customized versions of the Migration Enclave in order to
provision their own policies and certificates. Similarly, enclave
providers can customize the migration library e.g., in order to
enforce migration policies.
A. Migration Enclave
As described in Section V-B, the Migration Enclave serves
as a central entity to handle all migrations of one machine.
For outgoing migrations, it ensures that the remote Migration
Enclave attests with a trusted version of the Migration Enclave
code and can authenticate as belonging to the same cloud
provider. This ensures that enclaves can only be migrated to an
authorized destination machine, e.g., located within the same
data center. For incoming migrations, the Migration Enclave
ensures that the migration data is only sent to an enclave that
attests with exactly the same version as the source enclave
when sending the data. We now describe specifics of our local
and remote attestation.
The local attestation is kept simple as the Migration Library
locally attests to the Migration Enclave and in doing so creates
an encrypted channel to the Migration Enclave. Establishing
a secure channel is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol. This channel is opened when the Migration Library
initializes itself and can be used over the lifetime of the
enclave to send and also to receive migrations. During the local
attestation, the Migration Enclave stores the MRENCLAVE
value of the calling enclave as it is contained in the REPORT
that the local enclave sends to the Migration Enclave during
the attestation. This MRENCLAVE value will then be used for
incoming and outgoing migrations to match the migration data
to the recipient. On an outgoing migration, the MRENCLAVE
value is appended to the migration data of the enclave before
sending it to the destination Migration Enclave and on an
incoming migration, the migration data is matched to the local
enclave that has the same MRENCLAVE value. If there is no
matching enclave running on the machine for an incoming
migration, the migration data will be stored until an enclave
with the matching MRENCLAVE value performs a local
attestation.
The remote attestation has more requirements to be checked
by the Migration Enclave. Here, the Migration Enclave is not
only interested in checking the actual MRENCLAVE value
of its peer but it also has to authenticate its peer. The first
check is trivial as it is contained in the attestation report
structure that is used during the attestation. The Migration
Enclave simply checks this MRENCLAVE value and aborts
the attestation process if the peer enclave does not have the
same MRENCLAVE value as itself. After establishing the
secure channel via remote attestation, the Migration Enclaves
can perform the second check and authenticate each other.
6All software is available at: https://github.com/SGX-Cloud
migration_init(p_data_buffer, init_state, ME_address);
migration_start(destination_address);
Listing 1. Migration Library interface for the untrusted part of the application
B. Migration Library
The migration process has to be started from outside of
the enclave, i.e., from the untrusted part of the application.
Listing 1 shows the functionality that the Migration Library
provides to this untrusted part which is the migration operation
and one initialization operation that must be performed every
time the enclave is loaded. We now describe the migratable
sealing and the migratable counter functionality, and then the
persistent data that is used in the initialization operation.
Sealing: The migratable version of the sealing functions
are straightforward to implement. Instead of using the built-
in sealing functions by Intel SGX, the library generates a
Migration Sealing Key (MSK) once for every enclave and
uses that for the sealing functions throughout all migrations.
When migrating, the key is transferred to the new Migration
Library where it can be used again. Without re-encryption,
the process of migrating the sealed data is constant-time for
transferring the key and then linear for transferring the actual
sealed data. This process is secure because the MSK is only
ever transferred to trusted Migration Enclaves and from there
to the exact same enclave that generated the key. Thus, the
MSK never leaves the trusted environment in an unencrypted
form. From the point of view of the enclave developer, instead
of using the standard sealing functions, he now has to use the
migratable sealing functions which are identical to the standard
functions in terms of parameters required and results returned.
Listing 2 shows these new migratable function parameters. If
a developer decides that some data should not be migratable
it is still possible to use the native SGX sealing functions to
store that data.
Monotonic counters: One approach to migrate a counter is
for the source enclave to transfer the current counter value to
the destination enclave and have the latter create a new counter
and increment it until the counter value reaches the trans-
ferred value. However, this will incur significant performance
overhead because monotonic counter operations are usually
rate-limited. Instead, our implementation uses a counter offset,
which is initialized to zero. This offset is added to the current
counter value to compute the effective counter value. When
an enclave is started for the first time, the counter offset is
initialized to zero and the current counter value always equals
the effective counter value until the enclave is migrated. On
migration, the effective counter value of the source enclave
is sent to the destination enclave where it is set as the new
counter offset. The current counter value on the destination
enclave is initialized to zero right after the incoming migration.
The counter offset remains unchanged between migrations and
is sealed and stored locally. This design optimizes performance
because the processing time of a counter during migration is
constant, regardless of the counter value.
sgx_seal_migratable_data(
additional_MACtext_length, p_additional_MACtext,
text2encrypt_length, p_text2encrypt,
sealed_data_size, p_sealed_data);
sgx_unseal_migratable_data(p_sealed_data,
p_additional_MACtext, p_additional_MACtext_length,
p_decrypted_text, p_decrypted_text_length);
sgx_create_migratable_counter(p_counter_id,
p_counter_value);
sgx_destroy_migratable_counter(counter_id);
sgx_increment_migratable_counter(counter_id,
p_counter_value);
sgx_read_migratable_counter(counter_id, p_counter_value);
Listing 2. Migration Library enclave interface for the application enclave
If an enclave is malicious it can modify the offset values
in the library but we assume that the enclave is trusted,
because a malicious enclave could simply lie about counter
values or ignore them even when using native SGX counters.
However, the system is potentially open to rollback attacks
where an attacker provides old offset values to the Migration
Library. To mitigate this rollback attack, when migrating
counters to a new destination machine, the used monotonic
counters are deleted on the source machine by calling the
sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter function. The pro-
cess does not proceed until it receives the SGX_SUCCESS
return code, which indicates that the counter has been suc-
cessfully deleted. Only then, the Migration Library sends the
effective counter values and the list of active counters in
the migration data (see Table I) to the Migration Enclave.
This ensures that the monotonic counters cannot be used in
a rollback attack as Intel SGX ensures that deleted counters
cannot be accessed again. The migratable counter functions in
the library ensure that an error is properly thrown if a counter
does not exist, no matter what the value of the stored counter
offset.
As the Migration Library has to perform an extra addition
operation on all monotonic counter functions in order to
calculate the effective counter value, the Migration Library
provides wrapped functions of the standard monotonic counter
operations. In doing this, it assigns the monotonic counters
an internal counter id which can be used to access the
counter instead of requiring the Intel SGX UUID of the actual
monotonic counter. Using solely the counter id instead of the
Intel SGX UUIDs of the counters is not a security threat
as the Migration Library fully trusts the application enclave.
For the enclave developer that integrates the Migration Li-
brary this means that instead of storing the UUIDs of the
counters himself, he now only has to store the id that the
Migration Library assigned to the migratable counter. The
Migration Library will then handle the internal access to
the Intel SGX counter and add the migratable offset before
returning the effective counter value to the application enclave.
Listing 2 shows the migratable versions of the monotonic
counter operations. Instead of the standard monotonic counter
functions that require a SGX monotonic counter structure to
be passed to the function, the migratable version only requires
a counter id that is assigned and returned on creation of
TABLE I
DATASTRUCTURE OF THE MIGRATED DATA
Name Type Description
counters active bool[256] Shows used counters
counter values uint32[256] Used as next offset
MSK 128bit SGX key Used by migratable seal
TABLE II
DATASTRUCTURE OF THE MIGRATION LIBRARY INTERNALS
Name Type Description
frozen uint8 Freeze flag for migration
counters active bool[256] Shows used counters
counter uuids SGX counter[256] UUIDs of the SGX counters
counter offsets uint32[256] Offsets of the counters
MSK 128bit SGX key Used by migratable seal
the counter. This change from the UUID counter structure
to the counter id number is the only change in the function
parameters compared to the standard Intel SGX monotonic
counter functions. Note that the Migration Library does not
require its own monotonic counters and as such the application
enclave does not lose any monotonic counter capabilities by
utilizing the Migration Library. However, because it only
wraps the Intel SGX monotonic counters and does not replace
them internally, the Migration Library is still limited to the
same 256 monotonic counters that are the standard limit for
an Intel SGX enclave.
Persistent data: One downside of using an MSK and wrap-
ping the monotonic counters for the application enclave is
that the Migration Library has a need for persistent data that
is stored on the physical machine and then reloaded with
every enclave restart. This means that the Migration Library
needs to be initialized once for the lifetime of a migratable
enclave (for key generation) and then every time this enclave
is started (for reloading the key and counter offsets). We solve
this by handing the data in a sealed data blob over to the
untrusted part of the application to store it on the machine.
Whenever the enclave is started, the Migration Library has to
be initialized by the untrusted part of the application with this
sealed data buffer. Table II shows the data that is stored in
this initialization buffer. In addition to the MSK and counter
arrays, the buffer also stores a flag that identifies whether the
enclave has already been migrated. If this flag is active on
initialization, the library will refuse to operate.
C. Virtualization and Intel Platform Services
Application enclaves need to contact Intel Platform Services
enclaves for various reasons. In particular, when performing
remote attestation the quote is signed by the Quoting Enclave
that is part of Platform Services. Current SGX patches for
KVM modify the system such that enclaves can only run
inside VMs. The Platform Services, on the other hand, relies
on a particular piece of hardware (i.e. a PCI bus connected
device) to be available. So this device must be assigned to the
specific VM that runs the Platform Services. This corresponds
well with setting up a management VM on every host. It can
contain both the Platform Services enclaves and the Migration
Enclave.
The SGX SDK uses Unix sockets to communicate between
application enclaves and Platform Services enclaves. Since
these are not directly accessible from outside the VM, we
introduce two proxies to enable this communication. One
proxy is in the management VM and listens on a TCP socket
for incoming connection to pass them on to the Platform
Services Unix socket. The other proxy is running in other
VMs. It opens the Unix socket for local enclaves to connect
to and proxies these connections to the TCP socket inside
the management VM. Original Unix communication is opened
to eavesdropping by the untrusted operating system, hence
introducing two proxies does not affect the security guarantees.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the evaluation of our scheme in
terms of security, performance, and usability.
A. Security Evaluation
We evaluate the security of our solution in terms of the four
Security Requirements defined in Section IV.
SGX guarantees: Our library and migration protocols provide
the same security guarantees as a stand-alone non-migratable
SGX enclave. Firstly, the migratable versions of the sealing
and monotonic counter operations provide the same security
as the standard functions. The migratable sealing is done with
the same encryption method as the standard sealing and the
MSK is itself sealed with the standard sealing functions. The
migratable counter operations are also implemented using the
standard monotonic counter functions from the Intel SDK, but
also add the counter offset to the active counter value before
returning. Secondly, all communication between enclaves is
encrypted with symmetric keys established through a Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocol bound to the attestation
process. This ensures that the enclave’s migratable sealing key
is always protected and is only processed by the Migration
Enclaves, which are trusted. Thirdly, the Migration Enclave
on the destination machine uses local attestation to ensure that
only an enclave with the same identity as the source enclave
can receive the migrated data. This prevents an attacker from
setting up a malicious enclave to receive the migrated enclave
data.
The inclusion and use of our Migration Library does not
increase the attack surface for side-channel attacks against
the application enclave. The only migratable operation in-
volving secret data is the new migratable sealing function.
However, this function follows the same design as the standard
sgx_seal_data function (i.e., using the AES-NI hardware
instructions to encrypt the secret data), so it is no more
vulnerable to side-channel attacks than the standard function.
We therefore conclude that our solution achieves Security
Requirement R1.
Controlled migration: The identity of the Migration Enclave
is verified during the local attestation process before perform-
ing a migration. After that, the identity of the Migration En-
clave on the destination machine is verified and authenticated
by the Migration Enclave on the source machine. This ensures
that the destination Migration Enclave has a valid identity and
is running on an authorized machine. Finally, the Migration
Enclave on the destination machine only hands over the data
to a destination enclave that has the same identity as the source
enclave. We therefore conclude that our solution achieves
Security Requirement R2.
Fork prevention: Using our scheme, it is not possible for
an enclave to be active on two different machines with
inconsistent data. This is ensured by the Migration Enclave
which only sends the data to one destination machine and
from there to one destination enclave. Our scheme prevents
the type of fork attack described in Section III-B because
our Migration Library deletes the SGX monotonic counters
on the source machine before sending the migration data to
the Migration Enclave. This is possible because we also store
the counters’ UUIDs in the persistent data of the Migration
Library If the Migration Enclave is given obsolete persistent
data, the monotonic counters are unusable as they would have
been deleted by the SDK, even if the Migration Library might
not detect that the data is obsolete. Hence, trying to access the
counter that was initialized from the wrong offset value would
result in an error, no matter what the offset value is. Since we
assume that the enclave code is not malicious, it can detect
this situation by receiving a monotonic counter error and thus
the security is not violated. Thus our approach fulfils Security
Requirement R3.
Roll-back prevention: On any given machine, roll-back at-
tacks are prevented using SGX counters (as usual). Roll-
back attacks that could arise from migration (as described in
Section III-C) are prevented by migrating the counter values to
the destination enclave. This means that an enclave’s persistent
state cannot be rolled back to an earlier version, and thus our
scheme fulfils Security Requirement R4.
Software TCB size: As a software-only solution, our Mi-
gration Enclave and Library necessarily increase the size of
the software Trusted Computing Base (TCB). However, our
Migration Enclave and Library consist of 217 and 940 lines of
code respectively (excluding the SGX trusted libraries), which
is feasible to audit.
B. Performance Evaluation
We measured the performance of the migratable alternatives
of sealing and monotonic counters, as well as the initialization
operations performed when our Migration Library is started for
the first time, or subsequently restarted.
All these measurements were obtained by measuring the
time of an ECALL for each operation. For this we started the
enclave, measured the initialization of a new library buffer,
restarted the enclave, and measured the other ECALLs. After
this, we shut down the enclave. We repeated this process 1000
times and compared the results with the baseline performance
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when standard SGX primitives were used for the counter and
sealing operations. Obviously, there is no baseline for the
initialization of the library as this step is not required without
the Migration Library. We plot the average of all our results
together with error bars that show a 99% mean confidence
interval i.e., the true mean value is within the confidence
interval bar with 99% probability. We also used a 1-tailed
t-test to check if the differences are statistically significant.
Figure 3 shows the results of the monotonic counter op-
erations. The migratable versions of the counters introduce a
small overhead of at most 12.3%. This is a consequence of the
additional array operations performed by the library in order
to properly wrap the monotonic counter for the enclave. For
creating and destroying a counter, this means an additional
sealing of the internal data buffer that stores the counter
data, and for incrementing a counter this means performing
additional checks to prevent an integer overflow due to the
offset. The increment operation incurs an average overhead
of 12.3% (statistically significant, p ' 0) for migratable
counters, whereas the read operation has no statistically sig-
nificant overhead (p ' 0.12). Since reading and incrementing
counters are the most frequent operations (in that order), the
overhead introduced by our library is small for normal enclave
operations.
Figure 4 shows the measurements for the sealing and
unsealing operations, as well as for the initialization of the
library. The migratable sealing operations are actually slightly
faster than their standard SGX counterparts because the MSK
is already available from the library buffer. In contrast, the
standard SGX sealing operations have to perform an SGX
EGETKEY operation. The initialization of the Migration Li-
brary is very fast as it only generates a key and initializes the
arrays when creating a new buffer, and only has to unseal the
data when it is reloaded. Since this is only done once during
the lifetime of the enclave, the initialization time is negligible.
Additionally we measured the overhead that migrating an
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enclave introduces on top of VM migration. We migrated an
enclave 1000 times and calculated the average time of one
migration. The extra time for local attestation, communicating
with ME and sending over the sealed data is 0.47 (±0.035)
seconds. Since migrating the VM usually takes in order of
seconds [10], the overhead of migrating and enclave is small
by comparison.
C. Usability Evaluation
We argue qualitatively that the Migration Library is easy to
use for enclave developers. Initializing the Migration Library
requires only one function call after the enclave has been
started. Similarly, initiating the migration process also only
requires a single function call. For the functions provided by
the Migration Library, minimal effort is required to switch
from the non-migratable versions to the migratable versions.
For sealing, only the function name changes as the other
function parameters are identical to the standard SGX Library
functions. For the monotonic counter operations, the developer
only has to change the function name and switch from using
the SGX UUIDs to the counter id that is assigned by the
Migration Library. We argue that this is a reasonable low effort
to make an enclave migratable and conclude that our migration
system meets the defined usability goal.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
We identify several directions for the future work. Firstly,
our proposed framework requires the VM migration to become
non-transparent. In particular, not only the VM but also the
application containing the enclave must be notified of the
migration. It is necessary to modify the enclave and explicitly
register the application with the Migration Enclave. On one
hand, this allows a clear separation between migratable and
non-migratable enclaves, as well as migratable and non-
migratable objects within the enclave. But on the other hand,
this is in contrast to the common practice of VM migration
being transparent. Thus in some circumstances it is desirable
to be able to transparently migrate unmodified enclaves.
Secondly, we focused on migrating the persistent state of
the enclave. Migrating the data memory of the enclave is
an orthogonal challenge that can be solved e.g., using the
mechanism proposed by Gu et al. [2]. Combining the two
approaches would lead to a possibility to migrate enclaves
without the need to stop and restart them. However, we were
not able to integrate the mechanism by Gu et al. [2] into our
system, because it was not designed to target the standard SGX
SDK, and the source code is not available.
IX. RELATED WORK
A. Hardware security in the cloud
Although the use of hardware security technologies in the
cloud is a relatively new field, there have already been several
examples of their benefits in this setting. For example, Ama-
zon’s CloudHSM7 provides the functionality of a traditional
hardware security module to VMs in the cloud. In terms of
trusted execution environments, Intel has published a list of
recent research efforts using SGX, many of which target cloud
environments.8 Ohrimenko et al. [15] provide a framework for
privacy-preserving machine learning in a multi-party setting.
Using SGX, a machine learning algorithm hosted in the cloud
could be provided with privacy-sensitive data from multiple
parties. Tamrakar et al. [16] used both SGX and another type
of trusted execution environment, ARM TrustZone, in a cloud
setting to provide a scalable private membership test system
(e.g., for cloud-based malware checking). In particular, they
investigated how to avoid leaking data through memory access
patterns. The Signal messaging service recently announced
that they are using a similar SGX-based approach on their
servers to support private contact discovery.9
Zheng et al. [17] described Opaque, a distributed data
analytics platform, which uses SGX enclaves to support a
wide range of data queries while ensuring strong security
guarantees. In the VC3 system [18], SGX enclaves are used to
execute a MapReduce protocol securely on untrusted infras-
tructure. In order to authenticate the machines that belong to
the cloud provider, VC3 introduces the idea of a Cloud quoting
enclave. We propose a similar solution for authenticating
servers owned by the cloud provider.
Matetic et al. [19] specifically address the issue of rollback
protection in TEEs. They argue that the hardware-based mono-
tonic counters available in SGX suffer several disadvantages,
including rate-limiting and wear-out. They propose ROTE,
a system for maintaining virtual counters using consensus
among a group of SGX enclaves running on different physical
machines. A migratable enclave that uses ROTE would not
need to migrate monotonic counters, but would still require
a mechanism to securely migrate the keys it uses to identify
itself to the ROTE system.
7https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/
8https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx/academic-research
9https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/
B. SGX migration
The first attempt to address the problem of migrating an
SGX-enabled VM was presented by Park et al. [1]. They iden-
tified the central challenge of copying the enclave’s memory
to the destination machine, which naivly appears to violate
the SGX security guarantees (i.e., the source enclave’s data
become accessible outside the source enclave). They proposed
a conceptual solution that requires a new SGX hardware
instruction. This instruction would be use to agree on a live
migration key (LMK) between two SGX-enabled machines,
and then securely transfer the contents of an application
enclave from the source to the destination, encrypted using
the LMK. One advantage of this hardware-based approach
is that the migration occurs transparently to the migrating
enclave, and no software changes to the enclave are required.
However, the significant disadvantage is that this would require
extensive hardware changes. This proposal has therefore not
been evaluated.
Gu et al. [2] presented the current state-of-the-art software-
only framework to enable migration of VMs containing SGX
enclaves. They focus on the challenge of migrating the data
memory of an enclave and their approach is to add a library
to the enclave to support this. Their library performs remote
attestation and key agreement with the destination enclave. It
then re-encrypts the memory pages of the source enclave and
writes out the resulting encrypted data outside the enclave’s
memory. This can then be migrated with the VM and input
to the equivalent library in the destination enclave. Apart
from successfully migrating the enclave’s memory, they also
considered issues of multithreading, since the enclave may be
busy executing an ECALL when the migration takes place.
Their solution is to add a control thread to the enclave that
will be notified of the migration. This control thread then
pauses the execution of the enclave by spin-locking all worker
threads. Although this software-only solution cannot support
transparent migration, there are various ways in which the
enclave can be notified about the migration. One constraint
of migrating an enclave’s data memory via a software-only
solution is that all data memory on the source enclave must
be made readable by the migration functionality within the
enclave. The authors have presented an extensive performance
evaluation of their solution, but have not released the source
code.
Our solution builds upon some the ideas presented in
previous work (e.g., the migration enclave concept from Park
et al. [1] and the migration library idea from Gu et al. [2]).
However, neither of these solutions consider enclaves with
persistent state, leading to the potential attacks described in
Section III.
X. CONCLUSION
Hardware-based security technologies, like Intel SGX, can
provide strong security guarantees in a cloud computing set-
ting. However, in order to use SGX in a cloud environment,
it must be possible to migrate enclaves between physical ma-
chines. While previous work showed how to migrate the data
memory of enclaves, it did not consider migration of enclaves
with persistent state (i.e., sealed data or monotonic counters).
In this paper, we propose, design, and implement a framework
to enable migration of such enclaves while maintaining the
same functionality and security guarantees of non-migratable
SGX enclaves. Our framework, which can be integrated with
previous solutions, consists of a Migration Library that is
integrated into each migratable enclave, and a Migration
Enclave running in the management VM on each physical
machine. Our proof of concept implementation overcomes
several practical challenges, such as accessing architectural
enclaves from VMs and limiting the migration of enclaves
to authorized machines, whilst incurring low performance
overhead (less than 12.3%) and minimal additional effort for
enclave developers.
As future work, we plan to investigate how enclave
providers can provision customized migration policies with
their enclaves. For example, a migration policy could specify
minimum computational requirements of a destination ma-
chine, or ensure that a particular enclave is not migrated
outside a specified geographic region. These policies would
be enforced by the Migration Enclave and the mutual local
attestation between the enclave and the Migration Enclave
provides assurance that they will be enforced correctly.
As discussed in Section I, fully transparent migration of
enclave is not possible with current Intel SGX hardware.
In our framework, each application that uses enclaves must
be notified of the migration and must call the migrate()
function provided by our Migration Library. However, it may
be possible to perform the migration semi-transparently by
having the hypervisor or management VM locate and call
the migrate() function of all enclaves associated with a
particular VM. The migration process will then take place as
described in this paper, but will essentially be transparent to
the applications and OS of the guest VM.
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